While the proverbial “sun never sets in the British Empire” remains true, as the United Kingdom still has 14 overseas territories, there is a strong school of thought within the country that the island nation cannot defend itself if attacked, given its shrinking defence capabilities.
According to the 2026 Global Firepower (GFP) report, released on January 22, the UK ranked eighth among the 145 nations analysed.
Each country was evaluated on a multitude of (60+) factors related to a prolonged offensive or defensive military campaign. In this, the lower “PwrIndx score” is considered to be an index of strength; a score of 0. 0000 is supposedly “perfect”.
With a score of 0.1881, the UK ranked 8th, behind Japan (0.1876), France (0.1798), South Korea (0.1642), India (0.1346), China (0.0919), Russia (0.0791), and the United States (0.0741).
In other words, the five most powerful militaries are the United States, Russia, China, India, and South Korea. The U.S. remains the number one, according to the GFP.
Of course, as the 8th most powerful military, the UK remains a power of great consequence. But significant concerns persist regarding its depleted industrial base, inadequate arms, and thinning military manpower. All this has led to doubts about whether it can defend itself independently, without relying on U.S. support.
The following paragraphs reflect these concerns. And these are noteworthy as they come from a serving Chief of the Defence Staff and one of his predecessors.
General Sir Nick Carter – Chief of General Staff from 2014 to 2018 and Chief of the Defence Staff from June 2018 to November 2021 – laments that a long period of decline in the state of the UK’s defence capability has resulted in a situation that today “Our armed forces are hollow. And I fear our enemies and allies know this”.
He adds, “I doubt our army now could field many more than 10,000 combat troops. Our navy can deploy only 10 combat warships… the RAF has only 9 combat air squadrons, around 140 aircraft, which is roughly a tenth of what we had during the Cold War. And we have parlously low quantities of missiles and munitions…….
“As an island nation, we are extraordinarily vulnerable. We import around 40 per cent of our food, 45 per cent of our energy – much of it through undersea pipelines – and around 90 per cent of our data comes through undersea cables. The cyber threat to our national infrastructure is always growing. We have almost no ability to protect ourselves from ballistic missiles, and our air defences are no match for what we have seen playing out in Ukraine.’
What seems to pain General Carter more is that, over the years, the military’s manpower has been declining. He cites the YouGov polls in this regard.
These polls indicate low appetite for joining the British armed forces among young adults, with 38% of people under 40 saying they would refuse to serve in a new world war, and 30% refusing even if the UK faced imminent invasion.
As if this is not concerning enough, the present Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton, has reportedly revealed that the UK does not even have a plan to defend itself.
Apparently, the country is yet to revive a modern version of “the Government War Book”, a comprehensive set of plans for the whole country – from the armed forces, hospitals, and the police to industry, schools, and even art galleries – to transition from peace to war.
The last time London drew up such a war book was during the First World War, which it maintained until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. But, despite the return of conflict to Europe following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the British Government has not drawn up a new defence plan – something all NATO member states are required to maintain.
It may be noted that in 2024–25, the UK spent £66 billion (2.3% of national income) on defence. Defence spending has risen substantially in real terms over time, but by less than economic growth, and so has declined as a share of national income in the decades after the Second World War – a decline often referred to as the ‘peace dividend’. In 1955–56, for example, the UK spent 7.6% of GDP on defence, and in 1990–91, 3.2%.
Of course, in June last year, the UK government brought out what it said was its Strategic Defence Review (SDR), titled “ Making Britain Safer – Secure at Home, Strong Abroad”. It talked of a major overhaul of defence policy and a “root and branch” modernisation to address generational threats through technological innovation, increased readiness for war, and a “whole-of-society” approach to national security by 2035.
The review supports increasing defence spending towards the Government’s 3% of GDP target and emphasises a “whole-of-society” approach.
However, critics view this SDR as full of “ambitions” because the stated goals cannot be realised even if defence expenditure rises to 3 (three) per cent of GDP by 2035, as envisaged. For General Carter, nothing less than 5 (five) per cent of the GDP will do.
Air Chief Marshal Knighton does not talk of any figure, but is very clear that “If we wanted to do everything that’s currently in the programme and do all the extra things in the SDR, could we do that with the budget that we’ve got? The answer is no.”
Incidentally, he said all this very clearly last month (January 12) to Members of Parliament on the Defence Select Committee.
It is worth noting that last November, in a highly critical assessment, the Defence Committee of the British Parliament said that the UK was “nowhere near” where it needed to be to defend itself and its allies, especially at a time when security threats to Europe were “significant”.
In the committee’s view, the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and National Security Strategy (NSS) set out ambitious goals but lacked detail on prioritisation and capability trade-offs.
“The UK’s defence industrial base is not yet configured for sustained collective defence. It faces challenges in capacity, skills, innovation, procurement, and financing. The SDR and Defence Industrial Strategy outline a reform agenda, but implementation will be key. The Government must ensure that defence finance is accessible, predictable, and resilient—including for SMEs and start-ups”, it said.
The report was particularly critical of what it called the “glacial pace” of promised improvements to civil defence and resilience, saying the UK may be failing to meet its Nato Article 3 obligations to “maintain and develop individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack”.
Considering all this, the report called for strengthening “the UK’s defence posture, industrial resilience, and strategic leadership. These include annual updates on SDR implementation, urgent reform of security vetting, and the appointment of a Minister for Homeland Security. The UK must act decisively to ensure it remains secure at home and a credible leader abroad”.
Interestingly, there is a strong belief in the UK that if the country has neglected to build up its defence adequately and underfunded the military, it is mainly due to “overconfidence” in the reliability of the United States as the security provider.
Mark Urban, noted British columnist, argues that the UK’s ability to defend itself is severely challenged by a deep, long-standing dependence on the U.S. for intelligence, technology, advanced munitions, and strategic deterrence (the Trident nuclear deterrent).
Now that there are question marks over this American support, thanks to U.S. President Donald Trump’s changing priorities, the growing consensus among British strategic elites is that their country has no alternative but to become self-reliant by modernising equipment and strengthening the defence industrial base.
- Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
- CONTACT: prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com
