The prospect of a “NATO without the United States” seems to have shifted from a theoretical debate to a critical strategic concern for European leaders, with President Donald Trump’s increasing rigidity in pushing for Greenland, a semi-autonomous territory of fellow NATO country Denmark, to be America’s 51st state.
The U.S. President said on January 16 that Greenland is vital to US national security and confirmed that discussions with NATO are ongoing regarding the territory.
“NATO has been dealing with us on Greenland. We need Greenland for national security very badly, Trump told the reporters. “If we don’t have it, we have a big hole in national security — especially when it comes to what we’re doing in terms of the Golden Dome and all of the other things.”
But this does not find acceptance among the other 31 members, all of whom, sans Canada, are from Europe. It has been unimaginable for them to accept the scenario of a fellow NATO country seizing another country’s territory by military means.
As of now, Poland has warned that U.S. threats regarding Greenland could “end the alliance”.
Other European members like the United Kingdom, Germany, and France are discussing a “NATO military mission” in Greenland to protect it from a fellow member—the U.S.—signaling a historic rift.
As one writes this, soldiers from France, Germany, and other European countries have begun arriving in Greenland to help bolster the Arctic island’s security after a “fundamental disagreement” in talks involving Denmark, Greenland, and the United States earlier in the week.
Reportedly, France has sent 15 soldiers, and Germany has sent 13. Norway and Sweden are also sending. The mission has been described as a recognition-of-the-territory exercise, with troops planting the European Union’s flag on Greenland as a symbolic act.
The first French military elements are already en route”, and “others will follow”, French President Emmanuel Macron has said. French authorities have revealed that soldiers from the country’s mountain infantry unit were already in Nuuk, Greenland’s capital.
Germany is said to have deployed a reconnaissance team of 13 personnel to Greenland. Denmark has already increased its own military presence in Greenland and is planning to deploy more soldiers.
All this has resulted in a peculiar situation in global geopolitics – the prospect of a NATO without America – that was hitherto unimaginable.
Of course, during its 76-year history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has faced its share of crises, but none have been as grave as what it confronts today.
As it is, since the return of Trump to office last year, Trump’s policy of lessening the American share in the NATO-budget and differing stand on the response to the ongoing war in Ukraine had already dented at least two basic features of the alliance’s collective defense commitment – “shared understanding of the threats” to NATO members and “ security among members is indivisible”.
But Trump’s obsession with Greenland now could lead to the division, if not disintegration, of NATO, many experts apprehend.
If NATO really splits or disintegrates, with the United States out of it, what will happen? Are the Europeans prepared to live without the American security-guarantee?
Of course, security experts have been discussing these questions after Trump’s return last year. Recently, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a world-leading authority on global security, political risk, and military conflict, prepared a report titled “ Defending Europe Without the United States: Costs and Consequences”.
This report assessed the financial costs and defense industrial requirements for a European NATO to defend against a future Russian threat if the United States were to withdraw from NATO.
The U.S., it may be noted, accounts for roughly 65% of NATO’s total military spending.

According to the IISS report, to replace the currently assumed U.S. conventional capabilities assigned to the Euro-Atlantic theatre, European states would need to invest significant resources on top of already existing plans to boost military capacity.
Taking into consideration one-off procurement costs and assuming a 25-year lifecycle, the IISS estimates that these costs would amount to approximately USD 1 trillion.
More radical approaches to defence investment and defence spending levels closer to Cold War levels – where spending ‘routinely averaged’ over 3% – would be required.
Of course, on the positive side, the report said, several European countries and the European Union have already started paving the way for increased defence spending and a better defence investment environment. But whether the political will to deliver the spending levels necessary will be forthcoming across European nations remains to be seen, given the limited fiscal space for many governments.
The IISS report also pointed out that European allies would face defence industrial challenges. While procurement orders have picked up pace in the land domain, there has been less urgency in the naval and aerospace sectors, with little additional investment in production capacity.
This is problematic, as the large-scale provision of air and maritime platforms would be a key requirement if Europe were to replace the U.S. military’s contribution in these domains.
Taking into account defense-industrial challenges related to contracts, financing, workforce shortages, regulation, and the security of supply, the IISS estimates that, within the next decade, Europe’s defense industry will find it difficult to replace many US capabilities, particularly in the air and maritime domains.
“However, long lead times could be shortened provided significant investment in Europe’s industrial capability and the acquisition of complementary uninhabited systems”, ” the report said.
According to Ivo H. Daalder, Chief Executive Officer of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and former U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 2009 to 2013, European leaders do understand the challenge they face and are starting to act accordingly.
He reminds us how, at an EU summit in early March last year, European leaders agreed to borrow 150 billion euros ($162 billion) for defense production and to exempt defense spending from budgetary rules that limit annual spending for EU members, potentially adding another 650 billion euros ($701 billion) for defense over the next ten years.
But then, money is not the only challenge Europe will face in a NATO without the U.S. Time and American support during the transition period are the other two main challenges.
In the absence of the U.S., Europe would need two or three years to unify disparate doctrines and fragmented chains of command.
Dallder estimates that, at a minimum, European members need to commit to providing 75–80 percent of the forces necessary to implement the alliance’s regional defense plans by the early 2030s—and, in the longer term, to provide nearly all of those forces.
This will include developing critical capabilities—including satellite communications and advanced air and missile defenses—to conduct high-intensity and sustained combat operations. European leaders should also double down on recruiting, training, and exercising their military forces, he points out.
Apparently, at the moment, 30 NATO members have 1.5 million active military personnel. In the absence of America, they need to add 300,000 troops to replace the current U.S. capabilities, it is said.
Significantly, this period of transition requires American support. As Daalder argues, “ If the United States were to leave NATO and withdraw from Europe in a rapid and uncoordinated fashion, the integrated structure that has been built up over decades would likely collapse. European countries simply do not have the military and technological resources to immediately replace what has been supplied by the United States”.

A U.S. withdrawal would leave European allies “fighting blind” due to the loss of American-managed systems:
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Intelligence & Command: The U.S. provides the bulk of airborne warning (AWACS), strategic intelligence collection, and battlefield surveillance.
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Logistics & Enablers: Key capabilities like air-to-air refueling, strategic airlift, and space-based assets are almost entirely dependent on U.S. resources.
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Integrated Air Defense: NATO’s current air and ballistic missile defense systems are primarily built on U.S. technology and command structures.
However, the most significant loss the Europeans will face in a NATO without America is nuclear deterrence. Only France and the United Kingdom possess nuclear weapons, with combined totals (approx. 515 warheads) dwarfed by the 5000 that the U.S. is supposed to possess in its arsenal.
After all, Russia, arguably Europe’s biggest security threat, also has over 5000 nuclear warheads.
Incidentally, in the event of the United States’ withdrawal from NATO, the former will lose, too.
The U.S. will then have no access to its 31 permanent bases in Europe. These facilities, particularly Ramstein in Germany, are critical for operations and American power projection in the Middle East and Africa.
Secondly, decades of seamless intelligence sharing through NATO protocols would be disrupted in the event of a U.S.-Europe separation, limiting American “eyes and ears” across the entire Eurasian region.
Thirdly, arms sales to Europe, so critical to American defence manufacturers, would be severely jeopardised. It is not realized that following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, American arms sales to Europe have surged dramatically.
The value of the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Europe rose significantly, reaching an estimated $68 billion in 2024, a huge increase from the $11 billion average between 2017 and 2021.
In fact, U.S. arms exports reached an all-time high of $117.9 billion in Fiscal Year 2024, with a large portion of that funding provided by European allies and partners.
Obviously, a “separated” Europe pursuing massive military modernization to achieve self-sufficiency and strategic autonomy will pose significant risks to the market share of American defense firms.
Considering all this, one could say that a separation of Europe from the United States within NATO, which some describe as a “transatlantic divorce”, would be profoundly painful for both sides. It could lead to a major realignment of global security and economic disruption.
- Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
- CONTACT: prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com




