As the year draws to a close, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is being asked by President Xi Jinping to transform itself quickly into “new quality combat forces” by focusing on high-tech integration, joint operations, and “intelligentized warfare”.
Xi wants the PLA to move from being a mass army to becoming a technologically superior, modern force with AI, cyber, space, and advanced weaponry to dominate future conflicts and achieve “world-class” status by 2049.
In a scholarly piece, noted China watcher Arran Hope of D.C.-based Jamestown Foundation has pointed out how over the last few months there has been a proliferation of authoritative policy documents and commentaries in China discussing “new quality combat forces, a term that refers to the integration of emerging technologies with military capabilities.
Of course, this term entered the Chinese vocabulary last year (2024), when Xi disbanded the Strategic Support Force (SSF) and established in its place “New Quality Combat Forces.” This led to the various interpretations of the move, but the latest documents and commentaries have brought much clarity to the subject.
Last year’s overhaul had created what was said to be a “4+4” structure composed of four traditional services and four specialized arms directly under the Central Military Commission (CMC).
These arms supposedly serve as the “nervous system,” “eyes and ears,” and “cyber-shield” for the traditional services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force).
The first is called the Information Support Force (ISF), now the military’s “nervous center”. It coordinates the construction and application of network information systems to ensure the seamless flow of command, control, and intelligence across all theater commands.
For President Xi, the ISF is the military’s strategic arm and a key pillar in coordinating the construction and application of the network information system.
In fact, Xi, who also happens to be the chairman of the CMC, has urged the ISF to effectively support combat operations and maintain information superiority to achieve “joint victory” in the sense that for him it is vital that there is smooth information transmission, information resource integration and protection, as well as “the unit deeply integrating itself into the Chinese military’s joint operation system, precisely and effectively implementing information support to ensure operations in all directions and domains”.
Incidentally, at the grand September 3 military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of the victory in “the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War” the ISF had displayed battlefield network-cloud-equipped vehicles, “digital intelligence empowerment” vehicles, space-ground networking vehicles, and information integration vehicles, all capable of rapidly building new network-information systems to strongly support joint operations.
The second specialized arm is called the Cyberspace Force (CSF). As the “Shield”, it focuses on both offensive and defensive cyber operations. Its mandate includes electronic warfare, psychological warfare, and the detection and countering of network intrusions to safeguard “cyber sovereignty”.
Aerospace Force (ASF) is the third one to manage satellite-based navigation, surveillance, and reconnaissance. As “ eyes and ears” to the four major services of the Ground Force, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force that are “the fists of the PLA”, it is tasked with enhancing China’s ability to “enter, exit, and openly use space” while developing counter-space capabilities to disrupt adversary systems.
And finally, there is the Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF) to manage the supply of equipment, materials, and medical support across all five theater commands in China.
Incidentally, these four new arms are classified as “deputy theater command leader grade,” positioning them just below the theater commands. The idea here is to reduce bureaucratic bottlenecks, allowing theater commanders to access specialized support more efficiently.
The “New Quality” concept also emphasizes integrating emerging technologies like Artificial Intelligence (AI) and quantum computing with military capabilities to achieve “intelligentized” warfare.
Incidentally, Xi wants China to be “Combat Ready” by 2027, achieving a “historic breakthrough” in military modernization by integrating mechanization, informatization, and what is called “intelligentization”. For this, its arsenal will be large enough to possess advanced weaponry such as unmanned systems, robot wolves, 6th-Gen Fighters, and hypersonic weapons.
It is against this background that Arran Hope’s research has provided further clarity on the subject.
Quoting recent articles on “new quality combat forces” in the People’s Daily, he says how the Chinese officials are framing the ongoing developments in military technology in grandiose theoretical terms as the “acceleration of decision-making from ‘carbon-based’ to ‘silicon-based’, and from ‘cell bodies’ to ‘intelligent entities’”.
They are also arguing that decision-making is “even evolving toward a ‘human-out-of-the-loop’ model”, an evolution based on the direction of travel “toward intelligent, unmanned, and cross-domain operations” and “toward long-range precision, intelligence, stealth, and unmanned operations in weaponry and equipment”.
It is said that AI-powered autonomous weapon systems are evolving “from ‘execution tools’ to ‘intelligent nodes’” that even intersect with biology, such as brain science and human-machine interfaces, as well as bionic robots, and smart ammunition.
And intelligent algorithms are viewed as central for decision-making, to be integrated into command chains at “every stage of the kill chain, “enabling victory before the battle begins.
These novel technologies, Hope quotes the Chinese writings, are enabling the expansion of the battlespace into the emerging frontiers of the deep sea, outer space, cyberspace, and the cognitive domain, and are leading to the development of new tactics and phenomena such as “deepfakes and information silos.”
In fact, the Chinese leadership now attaches more importance to “system confrontation” than to “weaponry competition,” saying that future conflict will be one between national systems. And for this, synergies between the economic and military spheres must be enhanced.
Xi has articulated this by calling for “promoting the efficient integration and mutual reinforcement of new quality productive forces and new quality combat forces.”
Chinese experts see their President’s thoughts as an intensification of efforts to integrate all available state resources to pursue national goals and increase China’s comprehensive national power. The idea here is to ensure that civilian and military standards are harmonized so that “major infrastructure fully incorporates national defense requirements” and unity between the military and government, as well as between the military and the people, is consolidated.
However, Chinese experts, including those in the PLA, do realize that there are still myriad challenges in converting Xi’s ideas into shape. Though they are proud of their newly developed technologies and weapon systems, they do admit that there are still “technical gaps and capability weaknesses” vis-à-vis Western systems, as well as structural challenges and systemic obstacles.
Besides, no less than General Zhang Youxia, who is currently the first-ranked vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, has discussed personnel issues and warned about “harmful influences and entrenched evils” as well as “two-faced individuals”.
All told, corruption in the PLA is a persistent issue, leading to major purges. President Xi Jinping has not hesitated to target top brass, such as Rocket Force commanders and CMC members, for graft that has affected military readiness, procurement, and morale.
In fact, the CMC under XI has been reduced to its smallest size in decades, with key positions in the Eastern Theater Command and elsewhere lying vacant due to XI’s sacking.
Corruption involves illicit practices like bribery for promotions, embezzlement, and corrupt procurement networks, undermining meritocracy and draining resources. Scandals have revealed faulty missile systems (e.g., water-filled missiles) and non-functional silo lids, suggesting that corruption has compromised military effectiveness and Xi’s modernization goals.
Of course, there seem to be merits in military experts outside China pointing out the inherent limitations of centralizing decision-making power in Xi’s hands, and his insistence on strict party discipline runs counter to a mission command model.
And this is particularly so when the aging Chinese Generals have been nurtured through opaque structures and decision-making processes in the PLA over the years.
- Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
- CONTACT: prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com
