OPED By Imran Khurshid, PhD
A recent U.S. Department of Defense assessment, published in December 2025 as part of the Pentagon’s annual report to Congress titled Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, provides a detailed evaluation of China’s military capabilities, strategic ambitions, and regional influence, highlighting implications for U.S. interests and partners.
It notes that Beijing has sought to stabilise relations with India along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), not out of reconciliation, but to prevent India from deepening strategic alignment with the United States.
The report also highlights China’s expanding footprint across South Asia, particularly in Pakistan, through access to logistics, arms transfers, intelligence cooperation, and growing political leverage, reinforced by strategic infrastructure and defence partnerships.
These moves are part of Beijing’s broader ambitions, including its “Five Fingers” strategy and its long-term goal of national rejuvenation by 2049, under which territorial claims such as Arunachal Pradesh are treated as core interests.
Significantly, India and China have recently pursued tactical de-escalation along the LAC, following years of heightened tensions that began with the 2020 Galwan clash and subsequent standoffs in eastern Ladakh.
The October 2024 disengagement agreement led to troop withdrawals and the dismantling of temporary infrastructure at key standoff points in eastern Ladakh. This was complemented by established border-management mechanisms, including the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on Border Affairs and Senior Commanders’ Meetings, which maintain communication and prevent escalation.
High-level engagements and people-to-people initiatives—resumption of tourist visas, direct flights, and cultural exchanges—have aimed to normalise relations, even as mutual mistrust and unresolved territorial claims, particularly in Arunachal Pradesh, continue to limit long-term reconciliation.
While these measures may appear to be confidence-building for China, the Pentagon interprets them as a tactical lull aimed at slowing India–U.S. strategic alignment.
Yet despite recognising this dynamic, U.S. strategy in South Asia reveals a troubling contradiction. Instead of empowering India, the only regional power capable of counterbalancing China, Washington continues to pursue policies that weaken India’s position in its own neighbourhood. This fragmented approach directly undermines the United States’ stated objective of containing China.
Strengthening China at India’s Expense
The core problem lies in how the United States compartmentalises China. India is viewed as a crucial partner in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in maritime and technological domains. But in South Asia, Washington’s actions often align—deliberately or otherwise—with Beijing’s objective of constraining India’s regional influence. This contradiction is most visible in U.S. policy toward Pakistan.
Some argue that this is because the U.S. has divided its strategic responsibilities into different commands, with India falling under the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and Pakistan under the Central Command.
However, this structural division alone cannot explain the contradiction; the issue lies in the strategy itself, which requires a more integrated approach rather than being constrained by administrative boundaries. This contradiction is most visible in U.S. policy toward Pakistan.
Despite recognising China’s deep military and strategic penetration of Pakistan, the United States continues to strengthen Islamabad through IMF bailout packages, upgrades to F-16 fighter aircraft, and sustained diplomatic engagement with Pakistan’s military leadership.
This support is further reinforced through selective counterterrorism cooperation, intelligence sharing, military-to-military exchanges, and Washington’s influence in multilateral financial institutions.
While the U.S. may hope that engaging Pakistan will reduce China’s influence, in practice, these policies have not achieved that goal and instead undermine India. Islamabad’s geopolitical relevance and bargaining power, maintained through U.S. engagement, emboldens Pakistan’s posture toward India and reinforces the centrality of its military establishment.
The fact that Pakistan’s army chief, Asim Munir, felt emboldened—following public praise and endorsement from U.S. President Donald Trump during his visit to the United States in August 2025—to issue nuclear threats against India from U.S. soil reflects strategic indulgence rather than responsible deterrence.
Such actions directly weaken India’s security environment without delivering any meaningful leverage over China. Indeed, by strengthening Pakistan, U.S. policies may inadvertently be furthering their own strategic difficulties in the region, indirectly empowering China through its ally.
If Washington aims to counter Beijing, it must critically evaluate and recalibrate its strategy; otherwise, it risks facilitating China’s rise while constraining India’s regional role. If anything, these actions reinforce China’s long-standing objective of tying India down in South Asia while Beijing expands its power elsewhere.
The same pattern is now evident in Bangladesh. U.S. facilitation of political transition—driven by short-term tactical considerations—has failed to curb Chinese influence. On the contrary, the post-transition environment has provided Beijing with fresh strategic openings. Once again, Washington appears not to have fully assessed whether its actions undermine China or inadvertently advance Chinese interests.
This exposes a fundamental flaw in U.S. strategic thinking. Like any great power, China does not rise in fragments; its expansion is simultaneous and interconnected across the Indo-Pacific, South Asia, and its immediate periphery.
History suggests that rising powers first consolidate influence in their neighbourhood before projecting power farther afield. Beijing has pursued this trajectory with clarity and strategic intent, while other actors often lack comparable coherence. South Asia, therefore, is not peripheral to China’s rise but central to it.
Consequently, any credible strategy aimed at constraining or managing China must begin in its immediate neighbourhood, where Beijing seeks to entrench influence and shape the regional balance before extending its reach outward.
By contrast, U.S. strategy treats South Asia as secondary, focusing almost exclusively on the Indo-Pacific maritime theatre. Even there, Washington’s engagement has been selective and not fully committed, limiting the impact of its Indo-Pacific initiatives.
This approach ignores the reality that weakening India in South Asia directly undermines any broader effort to balance China. A regionally constrained India cannot effectively counter Beijing, regardless of how strong bilateral cooperation may be in the Indo-Pacific.
Need For An Integrated Strategy
If the United States is serious about containing China, it must move beyond this contradictory approach. Supporting Pakistan at India’s expense, destabilising India’s neighbourhood, and pursuing regime-centric tactics without long-term strategic assessment only play into China’s hands. These policies do not constrain Beijing; they facilitate its expansion.
What Washington needs is an integrated strategy—one that recognises South Asia and the Indo-Pacific as interconnected theatres of competition. Strengthening India’s regional position is not an act of favour or sentiment; it is a strategic necessity. The United States must also critically evaluate whether its current policies are producing outcomes that serve its own stated objectives.
Understanding China’s ambitions is only the first step. Strategy must ultimately be judged by results. At present, U.S. actions in South Asia risk accelerating the very rise they seek to contain. A recalibration is not optional—it is overdue.
- Dr. Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Peace Studies (ICPS), New Delhi. He specializes in India-US relations, Indo-Pacific studies, and South Asian security issues.
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