In a move set to reignite the debate over using Chinese appliances at sensitive military installations, Israel has reportedly begun confiscating Chinese electric cars given to senior IDF officers, amid fears of espionage, data leaks, and national security threats linked to potential unauthorised Chinese government access.
The IDF is recalling 700 Chinese electric cars, mostly the Chery Tiggo 8 Pro model, which had been offered to lieutenant colonels and colonels with large families since 2022.
The confiscation of Chinese electric cars began following orders from the IDF Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir.
According to Israeli media outlets 9TV and The Times of Israel, the decision was made after security services discovered that the machines’ systems could leak classified information or facilitate espionage.
The confiscation of Chinese electric cars will proceed in stages.
First, the Chinese vehicles will be confiscated from officers with access to classified information, and then from everyone else.
This process will last until the end of the first quarter of next year.
According to Israeli security services, many Chinese vehicles are equipped with cameras, microphones, sensors, and communication technology that transmit information to external servers. This transmission of data to external servers often occurs without the driver’s knowledge or consent, raising security concerns.
“The problem isn’t just cameras and microphones,” a former high-ranking officer explained to reporters. “Any modern vehicle is essentially a computer on wheels, with a closed operating system and wireless connectivity. It can collect intelligence from nearby targets.”
Notably, in August this year, the IDF banned all Chinese cars from entering military bases, over fears that their sensors and cameras could be used to collect sensitive information.
The directive ordered IDF officers and civilian employees of the military, who own Chinese vehicles, to park them outside military bases.
In July, the IDF initially restricted parking for Chinese vehicles at the Gideonim Communications Corps base near Tzrifin.
Then, in August, the restriction was expanded to all Chinese electric vehicles and to all IDF military bases. Owners of Chinese electric vehicles were instructed to park their cars in designated areas away from sensitive installations.
The restrictions on Chinese electric vehicles can have a profound impact, as according to local Israeli media, China accounted for nearly 25% of all vehicle imports into Israel and dominated the local electric vehicle market.
Furthermore, Chinese manufacturers are currently the only suppliers of mass-market electric cars priced under NIS 170,000 (US$52,076) and hybrids under NIS 150,000 (US$45,949).
The sweeping restrictions on Chinese electric cars could complicate future Ministry of Defense procurement tenders, as the lowest-cost options could be excluded.
Also, Israel is not alone in imposing sweeping restrictions on Chinese electric cars. Earlier this year, the United Kingdom also imposed a similar ban on Chinese vehicles entering military installations.
The latest restrictions on Chinese electric vehicles add to the long list of Chinese equipment banned over fears of illegal espionage and data leaks.
Chinese Equipment Banned Over Espionage Fears
There are several notable examples of governments banning or restricting Chinese-made products from military installations or networks, after citing risks of espionage, data leaks, or national security threats.
In 2017, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) restricted the use of Huawei and ZTE equipment in military networks and communications systems, based on U.S. intelligence assessments that the equipment could be used to spy on sensitive U.S. military installations.
Furthermore, in 2018, the Pentagon ordered the removal and ban on the sale of Huawei and ZTE mobile phones and devices from retail outlets on U.S. military bases worldwide, due to concerns that these products could enable Chinese espionage through embedded backdoors or data-transmission capabilities.
In 2018, the Australian government also banned Huawei and ZTE from supplying equipment for its National Broadband Network (NBN), including military communications infrastructure, following advice from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation.
The decision stemmed from fears that the equipment could enable Chinese intelligence agencies to access sensitive defense networks and conduct cyber espionage.
Following the US and Australia’s ban on Huawei and ZTE, the Japanese government also halted the procurement of Huawei and ZTE telecommunications equipment for its defense ministry’s networks and military bases.
The UK government ordered the removal of Huawei equipment from its 5G networks by 2027, explicitly including military and defense-related telecom systems.
The decision to ban Huawei from the UK’s 5G networks in 2020 followed scrutiny of the company’s links to Beijing and fears its equipment could be used for espionage. The decision delayed the country’s 5G rollout and is thought to have cost the UK at least £500 million (US$653 million).
National security laws in China require all citizens and organisations to help Beijing if required. Additionally, Ren Zhengfei, Huawei’s founder and chief executive, served in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for almost a decade before founding the company.
In 2022, the US banned the import and sale of surveillance cameras from Chinese firms Hikvision and Dahua for use in government buildings, including military facilities, citing their potential for espionage.
Furthermore, under the American Security Drone Act, federal agencies, including the Department of Defense (DoD), are prohibited from procuring or operating Chinese-made drones starting in December 2025 due to vulnerabilities that could enable remote hacking or the transmission of data to China for surveillance purposes.
Apart from Chinese telecom devices, drones, and surveillance cameras, the US has also imposed bans on Chinese apps such as TikTok, semiconductors from Chinese chipmaker Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), and Chinese-manufactured solar power inverters.
Even in the UK, concerns have been raised about Huawei’s dominance in solar panel manufacturing.
The US has also cited potential electronic espionage as the basis for restricting the use of new Chinese cargo terminal cranes at U.S. ports.
According to Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “China’s access to data and control of software and connected technology in the United States provides Beijing with potential tools to conduct espionage; influence politics; and, in extreme cases, attack critical infrastructure, commercial, and government networks inside the United States.”
Experts have also noted that Chinese autonomous cars driving on U.S. roads collect substantial, detailed information about their surroundings. Even Chinese-made subway or rail cars contain sophisticated sensors that could be used for espionage.
One major concern is that Chinese companies are subject to legal regimes that could compel them to cooperate with Chinese defense and intelligence services.
A 2025 Carnegie Endowment paper notes another lacuna in Chinese national security laws.
Cyber vulnerability regulations from 2021 require Chinese companies to report cyber vulnerabilities to the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology within forty-eight hours of discovering them—almost certainly before patching the vulnerabilities or disclosing them to customers.
This legal requirement could allow Chinese hackers to exploit the vulnerability before it is patched.
Clearly, the latest Israeli ban on Chinese electric cars is not an exception, but adds to the long list of Chinese equipment facing bans and restrictions over fears of espionage, hacking, and illegal data transfer.
When such restrictions are initiated by the US, Beijing often rejects them as American propaganda and insecurities stemming from strategic competition with China. It remains to be seen how China responds to the latest restrictions imposed by Israel.
- Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK.
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- He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com
