France has a complex relationship with the United States, fraught with both cooperation and competition. The two NATO allies cooperate on war, terrorism, and security issues, but their military programs don’t fully converge due to a strong sense of strategic autonomy that guides the French foreign and military policy.
The biggest example of this is the French reluctance to buy American military equipment, such as the F-35 Lightning II stealth fighters, unlike its peers in Europe.
In fact, when cracks started to appear in the US-European partnership following Donald Trump’s election as President, France started rallying support for European “defense independence” and positioned its weapons as a “European substitute” for American arms.
The French President Emmanuel Macron has since been wooing customers for Rafale jets by exploiting the calls for “self-reliance” across Europe, triggered by Trump’s relinquishing the responsibility of Europe’s security. In addition to this, he made a Rafale offering to Canada immediately after the Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced that the country was reconsidering its purchase of F-35A stealth fighters.
France has long positioned itself as a leader in Europe, leveraging its historical influence, economic weight, and diplomatic clout to shape the European Union’s direction. French President Emmanuel Macron is now further building upon this legacy to position himself as the strongest leader of Europe and to wean Europe off the dependence on Washington.
This became evident when he signalled a potential expansion of France’s nuclear deterrence to its European partners in March 2025.
“Our nuclear deterrence protects us—it is complete, sovereign, and entirely French,” Macron emphasized in a live broadcast on his official social media channels. France is one of only three NATO countries with nuclear weapons, alongside the US and the UK.
While the British nuclear program has been closely linked to that of the US, France chose to chart its own course since the very beginning.
France has a history of defying the United States and the NATO alliance in favor of strategic autonomy. In 1966, the then-French President Charles de Gaulle withdrew the country from NATO’s integrated military command due to his discontent with the leadership that the US enjoyed within the alliance.
The President viewed the NATO alliance as overly dominated by American interests, with the US exerting significant control over military strategy and decision-making.
Following the humiliations of World War II and colonial losses, De Gaulle aimed to regain France’s position as a major power. His idea of grandeur was centered on an autonomous foreign and defense strategy, and dependence on NATO’s “integrated leadership” was viewed as being subordinate to Washington because it meant that French forces would remain under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commanders, who were often Americans.
De Gaulle wanted French troops to answer solely to French leadership. Moreover, he wanted France to maintain full control over its nuclear strategy, free from NATO’s framework, which was heavily influenced by US and British nuclear policies at the time.
He believed that NATO, under strong US leadership, compromised French sovereignty. So, he withdrew his country from the NATO alliance in March 1966, following which the headquarters of NATO was moved from Paris to Brussels.
This bolstered de Gaulle’s image as a defender of French independence and allowed Paris to pursue an independent defense policy while still benefiting from NATO’s collective security guarantees, albeit indirectly.
France eventually reintegrated into NATO’s military structure under later presidents, fully rejoining in 2009 under Nicolas Sarkozy. However, the pullout had a deep impact on the independence of French defense programs and its foreign policy–one that still guides its relationship with other powers, especially the United States.
No American Jets For France
France doesn’t buy American fighter jets primarily due to a combination of national pride, strategic independence, and a robust domestic aerospace industry.
Strategically, France prioritizes autonomy in its defense policy. Buying American jets would tie France to US supply chains, maintenance contracts, and potential geopolitical influence, which conflicts with its desire to maintain an independent foreign and defense policy.
Economically, the French aerospace sector employs thousands and generates substantial revenue. So, purchasing foreign jets would undermine domestic jobs and innovation, reduce faith in French platforms, and shrink the export market for French aircraft.
France’s commitment to pursuing an independent military program was accompanied by early investments in the domestic industry, including aerospace.
The investments in Marcel Dassault’s post-war designs created a self-reinforcing cycle. It developed Mystere IV, the Mirage series of jets, and ultimately the Rafale. During the 1967 war, during which Israel deployed the French Mirage fighters, France realized it could produce world-class jets. This made it logical to continue developing domestic solutions rather than pivot to US imports.
By the 1970s and 1980s, with the Mirage 2000 and Rafale programs, France had built a mature ecosystem of suppliers, engineers, and expertise, making reliance on foreign jets unnecessary.
Before the Rafale came about, there was a brief window of time where the French partnered with European countries to develop a common European 4+-generation combat aircraft.
Initially, France joined the multinational effort with the UK, Germany, Italy, and Spain to develop the “Future European Fighter Aircraft” (FEFA) in 1983. However, differences soon arose over design requirements and France’s indispensable need for a carrier-capable fighter.
This was the moment of reckoning for France, and it expectedly chose independence. It quit the FEFA in 1985 and embarked on the development of its own 4.5th-generation aircraft, the Rafale. Dassault Aviation and Airbus (which holds a 46% stake in the Eurofighter Typhoon) went from being potential collaborators to competitors.
After this, France never really looked back. So when, during the early 1990s, many NATO nations collaborated with the US on the F-35 program, France opted out.
The F-35, developed by Lockheed Martin, an American company, remained the primary contractor. With key partners Northrop Grumman and UK-based BAE Systems, it became a flagship multinational defense program, with 19 countries purchasing or committing to the aircraft.
Despite its technological advancements and cost-sharing benefits, the F-35 program required participating nations to align with US defense priorities and share sensitive operational data. France, committed to strategic autonomy, opted to develop its own advanced fighter instead of joining the F-35 program.
Prioritizing sovereignty, it chose the Dassault Rafale over the F-35, maintaining independence despite being a NATO member.
American fighter jets come with stringent export controls, including restrictions on technology transfer, modifications, and data sharing. For instance, the F-35’s software and maintenance systems are heavily controlled by the US, limiting operational flexibility for buyers. France, as a nation with global military ambitions, found these restrictions incompatible with its requirements.
It was certain that continuing development of a domestic platform like the Rafale would allow it to customize systems, control upgrades, and export without US approval.
For France, being a junior partner to the US is akin to a travesty for French pride.
France has long championed European defense cooperation as a counterbalance to US dominance in NATO. Developing its own aircraft and later collaborating on projects like the Eurofighter and the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) with Germany and Spain, aligned with its goal of fostering technological and military independence.
However, much like the Eurofighter program, there is a strong indication of a French exit from the European Future Combat Air System (FCAS).
While France had earlier hinted that it could go ‘solo’, Germany is now mulling the possibility of replacing France with another international partner.
Frustrated by Dassault Aviation’s demand for an outsized role, Germany is assessing the possibility of replacing France with the UK or Sweden, or going alone with Spain if the two countries are unable to chalk out a solution by the end of this year, Politico reported.
There are some very major differences between contractors Dassault Aviation, which represents France, and Airbus, representing Germany and Spain.
Dassault CEO Eric Trappier states that only his company has the necessary skills to develop the NGF, dismissing the idea of sharing work on that project. Trappier has maintained that the project should be led by Dassault and the French government, emphasising that a partnership centered on sharing work might result in subpar technology.
Airbus has been resisting these demands, pushing for a more balanced division and influence over critical systems like flight controls and stealth technology.
Berlin and Paris decided in July to try to resolve differences in the fall and make a decision by the end of the year on whether to proceed with FCAS to Phase 2, where businesses will need to develop a demonstrator aircraft. However, discontent is brewing.
If France walks out of the FCAS to develop its own sixth-generation aircraft, it would become yet another landmark moment in the French defense policy.
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