In 1974, three years after Bangladesh’s bloody separation from Pakistan, legendary Pakistani poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz visited Dhaka as part of a cultural advisory group. Intended as a relationship-rebuilding exercise, Faiz was shocked to see the level of animosity among Bangladeshi intellectuals towards their former countrymen from West Pakistan.
The horrors committed by the Pakistani Army during the Bangladesh War of Liberation in 1971 can not be washed away by a few diplomatic visits, Faiz concluded with a heavy heart.
On his return journey from Dhaka, Faiz penned these memorable lines:
We stand estranged, after so many hospitalities..
How many meetings will it take for us to get acquainted again..
When will we behold unblemished bloom of green fields..
How many rains will it take to wash away the blood stains..
Though written in the context of Pakistan’s broken relationship with Bangladesh, the lines can aptly sum up the high hopes placed in the India-China relationship after the exchange of just a few diplomatic pleasantries.
The sharp turnaround in the sentiments in New Delhi towards Beijing, from open hostility in May during the brief India-Pakistan War, when Beijing openly aided Islamabad, to one of hope, sadly, has a close historical parallel.
A historical parallel that New Delhi would like to forget, but can ignore only at its own peril.
From ‘Hindi-China Bhai-Bhai’ To The 1962 War
In the 1950s, ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai’ (Indian-China brothers) was a popular slogan in India that attempted to gloss over the complex boundary dispute between the two countries.
In 1954, India signed the Panchsheel Agreement with China, promoting peaceful coexistence, overlooking the fact that just four years ago, Beijing had annexed Tibet, bringing China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on India’s long Himalayan frontier.
India, under Nehru, championed non-alignment and trusted China’s intentions, even supporting its UN aspirations. However, this trust was betrayed, culminating in the 1962 Sino-Indian War and India’s humiliating defeat.
India not only lost a huge territory in the Laddakh sector, but coming just 15 years after India’s independence, following centuries of colonial exploitation, the loss badly shook the confidence and self-image of the newly independent country.
Just a few feel-good photo-ops at international summits cannot change the geopolitical dynamics between New Delhi and Beijing, which share a nearly 4,000-km-long contested border and are engaged in intense geopolitical rivalry for domination in a host of regions, from the Indo-Pacific to India’s immediate neighbourhood.
China’s Complex Messaging Amid Modi’s China Visit
While the media in New Delhi presented a largely one-dimensional, rosy picture of Modi’s visit to China for the SCO summit, the press in China took a more nuanced approach in its coverage.
As Indian PM Modi landed in Tianjin on August 30, China’s state-run CCTV released a video detailing the capabilities of its PL-15 missile.
While seemingly ordinary, the video was quite remarkable at this sensitive moment.
“Not only did it serve as a showcase for China’s military industrial prowess, but it also sent a subtle yet powerful signal to India: Don’t be complacent; the true capabilities of the country (China) may be far more complex and challenging than you (India) imagine,” commented a blog post in a popular Chinese micro-blogging site, Sohu.
While the state-run Chinese media has been releasing reports on various Chinese weapons systems in the build-up to the September 3 military parade in Beijing, marking the 80th anniversary of China’s victory over Japan in the Second World War, what makes the mention of the PL-15 air-to-air missile particularly significant (and hard to miss from New Delhi’s perspective) was the fact that this missile was Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) primary offensive weapon during the four day war with India in May this year.
Islamabad claimed that it shot down multiple Indian fighter jets, including Rafales, using its Chinese jets JF-17 and J-10C, armed with PL-15 AAMs. India has acknowledged combat losses but refuted Pakistani claims as exaggerated.
India also picked up several pieces of the PL-15 missiles after the conflict, confirming their use by the PAF during the conflict.
Given this background, the decision to strategically air the report about the PL-15 missile, coinciding with Modi’s China visit, can only be construed as subtle messaging by China that New Delhi should not underestimate China’s military power and the fact that it holds many cards against India, with Pakistan just one of those cards.
The Many Hurdles Between India-China Friendship
The many complexities of the India-China relationship can also be read in the joint declaration of the 2025 SCO summit in Tianjin.
While the mention of the Pahalgam terror attack was a significant victory for New Delhi, what many Indian media outlets are not telling is the fact that the very next line in the joint declaration mentions two terror attacks in Pakistan.
“Member States strongly condemned the terrorist attack in Pahalgam on 22 April 2025. Member States also strongly condemned the terrorist attacks on Jaffer Express on 11 March and in Khuzdar on 21 May 2025,” read the joint statement.
In effect, the joint declaration tries to establish that India and Pakistan are both victims of terrorism. New Delhi has long resisted attempts to equate it with Islamabad.
Furthermore, another paragraph in the joint declaration brings forth the complex relationship between Beijing and New Delhi.
“The Republic of Belarus, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Russian Federation, Republic of Tajikistan and Republic of Uzbekistan, reaffirming their support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), noted the ongoing work on the joint implementation of this project, including efforts to align the development of the Eurasian Economic Union and the BRI,” read sthe joint declaration.
This paragraph mentions nine out of the 10 SCO member countries, as India has refused to join China’s ambitious multi-billion-dollar infrastructure initiative that aims to connect the world with China through a series of sea and land routes.
Not only has India refused to join the BRI, it has also encouraged, often unsuccessfully, its neighboring countries not to join the initiative.
While Beijing has tried to portray its BRI initiative as a benign project to help develop countries in the Global South, India has led the criticism against the project, often terming it Beijing’s hegemonic project designed to ensnare poor countries into China’s debt trap.
The India-China conflict over the BRI represents New Delhi and Beijing’s jostling for influence in various parts of the world, underscoring the fact that the two countries are engaged in an intense geopolitical rivalry and competition for resources, markets, and influence, with their interests likely to clash in multiple areas.
China, understandably, views India as a potential rival and challenger to its dominance, first in Asia and then globally.
India is already the world’s most populous country and will remain so for many coming decades. The Indian population is, on average, 10 years younger than the Chinese population.
India is already the world’s fourth-largest economy and is expected to become the third-largest by 2028. Notably, India has been growing faster than China for several years now and is likely to remain the fastest-growing major economy for many years to come.
China recognizes that the US may be its immediate concern, but in the long term, India will be its strategic rival. Beijing also knows that, unlike London, Berlin, or Islamabad, New Delhi highly values its strategic autonomy and will not accept the role of a junior, compliant partner.
Of course, the elephant in the room is nearly 4,000 km of the contested Himalayan border with China. The two countries fought a full-scale war in 1962 and saw multiple skirmishes in 1967 (Nathu La and Cho La).
There was a major flare-up in Dokhlam in 2017. The 2020 Galwan Valley clash resulted in multiple casualties on both sides, which significantly derailed the bilateral relationship. The border remains tense, and the situation could escalate at any time.
Then there is the question of China’s strategic partnership with Pakistan. Islamabad is arguably one of Beijing’s oldest strategic partners. Despite Pakistan’s precarious economic situation, Beijing has made it clear that it will not allow Pakistan to collapse.
Beijing’s relationship with Islamabad is bound to create frictions in its ties with New Delhi.
The strategic reset in India-China ties, two of the world’s most populous countries, is undoubtedly a welcome development. However, New Delhi must remain rooted in reality and avoid ‘Missing the woods for the trees”. Else, New Delhi risks repeating the same mistakes it committed in the 1950s.
- Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern History from the University of Sheffield, UK.
- THIS IS AN OP-ED. VIEWS PERSONAL OF THE AUTHOR.
- He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com
