China-Bangladesh-Pakistan Axis Rattles India, Challenges U.S. Strategy In Indo-Pacific; How Will Washington, Delhi Respond? OPED

OPED By Dr. Imran Khurshid

A new trilateral axis is quietly taking shape on India’s doorstep, challenging existing strategic equations. Its cooperative veneer belies deeper ambitions that may disrupt South Asia’s fragile stability.

A recent trilateral meeting between China, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, held in Kunming, the capital of China’s Yunnan province, marks the emergence of a new strategic initiative with far-reaching geopolitical implications.

The meeting, held on June 19, 2025, was attended by Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong, Bangladesh’s Acting Foreign Secretary Ruhul Alam Siddique, and Pakistan’s Additional Foreign Secretary Imran Ahmed Siddiqui. Notably, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Amna Baloch also joined the first phase via video link, according to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This trilateral mechanism follows a similar earlier initiative involving China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. However, the timing and context of this Kunming dialogue—amidst India’s tense relations with both Pakistan and China, and a deteriorating bilateral trajectory with Bangladesh under the interim leadership of Mohammad Yunus—clearly signal strategic intent.

Despite the official joint statement stressing that the initiative is “not directed at any third party” and is grounded in “true multilateralism and open regionalism,” the political undertones and regional alignments reveal a different reality.

Geostrategic Camouflage

All major geopolitical initiatives are typically cloaked in carefully curated diplomatic language, and this case is no exception.

Bangladesh’s initial reluctance to publicize the Kunming meeting—reportedly requesting China to share its press statement in advance—reflects not just caution but an awareness of the meeting’s potentially controversial and provocative implications.

In contrast, Pakistan’s decision to release its version of the statement independently—a move some Bangladeshi officials privately described as a “betrayal”—hints at underlying tensions within the emerging trilateral framework.

Prominent Bangladeshi economist Dr. Selim Raihan, Professor at the University of Dhaka and Executive Director of the South Asian Network on Economic Modeling (SANEM), questioned the legitimacy of the unelected interim government in Dhaka to participate in such high-stakes geostrategic dialogues.

He remarked that “critical decisions should be left to an elected government”—a sentiment reflecting growing unease in sections of Bangladesh’s civil society over the lack of democratic oversight in shaping long-term foreign policy.

These concerns are amplified by the fact that the interim administration under Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus has undertaken significant diplomatic engagements—such as enhancing ties with China and re-establishing maritime links with Pakistan—without parliamentary scrutiny, raising questions about the durability and legitimacy of these decisions in the absence of an electoral mandate.

CPEC Linkages

The Kunming meeting focused on a broad spectrum of cooperation areas, including trade, industrial joint ventures, digital connectivity, maritime logistics, agricultural collaboration, climate action, health, education, youth exchanges, and people-to-people initiatives.

A dedicated working group was established to implement pilot projects under each of these domains, reflecting an intent to institutionalize the trilateral engagement into concrete developmental outcomes.

Crucially, the dialogue also explored the “eastward extension” of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—a move with significant strategic implications. While not explicitly mentioned in the joint statement, reports indicate that Beijing is keen to link CPEC more closely with Bangladesh’s infrastructure networks, potentially through enhanced road, rail, and maritime connectivity.

Such a proposal is deeply contentious for India, which has categorically opposed CPEC due to its alignment through Pakistan-occupied Jammu & Kashmir (PoJK)—territory India claims as an integral part of its sovereign domain.

Any attempt to extend CPEC eastward toward Bangladesh would not only deepen China’s strategic footprint in India’s neighbourhood but also directly challenge India’s core strategic and territorial interests, raising the stakes in an already tense regional environment.

Undermining India’s Regional Initiatives

This emerging trilateral cooperation poses a potential strategic challenge to India’s role in regional mechanisms such as SAARC, BIMSTEC, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).

If institutionalized, it may dilute India’s strategic influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region by introducing a parallel framework, dominated by China and cutting across traditional groupings.

Through this initiative, China gains dual strategic access: to the east via Bangladesh’s maritime platforms in the Bay of Bengal, and to the west through Pakistan’s ports and infrastructure, potentially surrounding India and eroding its strategic depth.

Beijing’s approach—anchored in economic statecraft, defense diplomacy, and connectivity under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—is clearly aimed at reshaping the regional order and challenging India’s leadership.

For New Delhi, the strategic imperative is twofold: to reinforce existing regional platforms such as BIMSTEC—where Dhaka has historically aligned with India—and to vigorously counterbalance China’s growing influence in Bangladesh.

India must improve its performance in areas such as maritime connectivity, infrastructure financing, and regional security cooperation, while also recalibrating its engagement in multilateral forums to counter any emerging Chinese-led alternative architecture.

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi (R) shakes hands with US President Donald Trump before a meeting at Hyderabad House in New Delhi on February 25, 2020. (Photo by Mandel NGAN / AFP)

Bangladesh’s Strategic Drift

Historically, Bangladesh has enjoyed robust people-to-people, cultural, civilizational, and economic ties with India.

Successive governments led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina have maintained a policy of mutual respect and strategic cooperation, carefully avoiding steps that could challenge India’s interests—including actions that might destabilize India’s Northeast or threaten the sensitive Siliguri Corridor (the narrow “Chicken’s Neck” that connects mainland India with its northeastern states).

The interim government’s participation in a trilateral initiative with China and Pakistan constitutes a direct strategic threat to India. Such engagement risks undermining the goodwill and strategic trust built over decades.

There were already deep concerns in New Delhi following Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus’s visit to China, where he made anti-India statements, most notably describing Bangladesh as the “only guardian of the ocean for all in this region.”

The remarks were widely interpreted as highlighting India’s strategic vulnerability to China, implicitly inviting greater Chinese geostrategic presence in the Bay of Bengal and attempting to sideline India as the natural gateway to its own Northeast.

Alarm bells in New Delhi were also triggered by reports that Bangladesh, with Chinese assistance, is considering the revival of the Lalmonirhat airfield—a military facility in northern Bangladesh located just 12 to 20 kilometers from the Indian border, and well within striking distance of the Siliguri Corridor. Strategic analysts, such as Brahma Chellaney, have warned that the revival of this airbase could enable Chinese aerial surveillance over India’s northeastern states and key strategic corridors.

Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma also cautioned that any threat to the Siliguri Corridor—or India’s “Chicken’s Neck”—would… provoke a firm response.” This has now further amplified those concerns.

A Regional Triangle Or Strategic Encirclement?

Experts have warned that this emerging trilateral framework could evolve into a strategic triangle aimed at the military and economic encirclement of India.

Major General Sudhakar Jee described the arrangement as a potential “devil triangle” that could choke the Siliguri Corridor, severing India’s connection to its Northeast and creating a permanent two-front threat, leveraging the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) to secure access to the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea.

Subhashish Banerjee, founder of the P3 Think Tank, interpreted the initiative as part of China’s strategy to dominate the Asian economic corridor under the guise of cooperation, warning that it masks deeper geopolitical ambitions.

Veteran Bangladesh affairs analyst Gautam Lahiri echoed these concerns, highlighting that the informal inclusion of CPEC in such dialogues—though not formally acknowledged—serves as a red flag for India’s national security, signaling a shift from economic cooperation to strategic containment.

These developments, analysts argue, align with a broader pattern of Chinese strategic encirclement, targeting India’s narrow vulnerabilities through its eastern and western flanks—Bangladesh and Pakistan—under the guise of civilian connectivity, which could potentially be converted into military leverage.

Implications For The Indo-Pacific

This trilateral initiative not only affects India; it carries significant implications for the broader Indo-Pacific architecture.

If China succeeds in institutionalizing this cooperation, it will challenge the core of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, which seeks to maintain a balance of power and ensure a free and open region. A China-led structure in South Asia would inevitably reduce American strategic space and dilute Washington’s influence.

China’s long-term objective is clear: to reduce both Indian and U.S. influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region by creating a web of connectivity, economic dependencies, and military partnerships. The U.S. and India must therefore align more closely and reinforce their shared vision for regional peace, stability, and economic growth.

Conclusion

The China-Bangladesh-Pakistan trilateral framework is more than a regional dialogue; it represents a calculated geopolitical maneuver to redraw the strategic contours of South Asia.

Despite diplomatic assurances that it is not aimed at any third party, its composition, context, and content unmistakably suggest otherwise. New Delhi has no interest in destabilizing any neighbouring country. Its vision is anchored in peaceful coexistence and regional development.

However, India cannot remain a passive observer when its national security and strategic interests are being compromised. Bangladesh, which has greatly benefited from its historical ties with India, must reconsider the long-term implications of aligning with initiatives that undermine regional trust and stability.

In the end, diplomatic language may veil intentions, but strategic communities in India and beyond are unlikely to be misled. The need for India and the United States to coordinate and counter such evolving regional alignments has never been more urgent.

These developments will have serious and lasting implications for the region’s security.

  • Dr. Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Peace Studies (ICPS), New Delhi. He specializes in India-US relations, Indo-Pacific studies, and South Asian security issues.
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