On June 16, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed that during the latest wave of missile strikes on Israel, they had employed “new methods” that caused Israeli air defense systems to attack each other.
Tasnim News Agency quoted the IRGC as saying:
“During this operation, thanks to the use of new methods and capabilities in intelligence and equipment, the enemy’s multi-layered defense command and control systems failed and began to attack each other.”
This sensational claim raises the question: Is it technologically possible to cause an adversary’s missile interceptors to turn on each other?
Supporting the IRGC’s contention, Sputnik International quoted Russian military expert and historian of the Air Defense Forces, Yuri Knutov, as saying:
“Based on the footage that was released, it seems the Iranians were able to breach the data transmission and correction signal system at an early stage—when the missiles were still in flight—by using an inertial guidance system. As a result, the system misdirected the missiles, not toward their intended targets, but toward Israel’s own surface-to-air missile batteries, leading to a strike on them.”
In the following narrative, I will explain the claim in simpler terms and then assess its feasibility. But first, we need to briefly review the multi-layered air defense system deployed by Israel.
Israel’s Multi-Layered Air Defence Systems
Israel’s multi-tiered air defense architecture—comprising Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow 2, and Arrow 3—employs advanced interceptors designed to counter a wide spectrum of aerial threats, from short-range rockets to exo-atmospheric ballistic missiles.
Iron Dome is optimized for short-range threats (4–70 km), such as rockets and artillery shells. It uses Tamir interceptors guided by radar and equipped with electro-optical sensors for precise tracking and proximity-fused detonation.
The system has demonstrated a success rate of around 90% in operational use.
David’s Sling is designed to intercept medium- to long-range rockets, cruise missiles, and some ballistic missiles (40–300 km). It uses the Stunner interceptor, a two-stage, hit-to-kill missile featuring dual-mode guidance—active radar and imaging infrared. Target tracking is provided by the EL/M-2084 AESA radar, enabling high maneuverability and accuracy without the need for a warhead.
Arrow 2 is intended for intercepting short- to medium-range ballistic missiles in the upper atmosphere (up to ~500 km). It uses radar-guided interceptors with proximity-fused warheads to detonate near incoming threats.
Arrow 3 provides the outermost layer, targeting exo-atmospheric ballistic threats (up to ~1,500 km range). It uses a kinetic kill vehicle guided by advanced radar for direct-impact (hit-to-kill) interception in space.
Interceptor Missile Guidance
As evident from the summary above, Israeli interceptor missiles use different techniques for terminal guidance.
However, immediately after launch, most surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are steered toward their targets using command guidance. In this initial phase, ground-based radar tracks both the target and the missile, sending real-time steering commands via an uplink to guide the missile along the correct trajectory.
This approach is especially effective for placing the missile on an optimal intercept course, particularly in medium- to long-range systems.
During this midcourse phase, uplink guidance signals continuously provide updates on the projected interception point. The missile’s inertial navigation system (INS) works in conjunction with these updates to steer the missile toward that point with increasing precision.
Spoofing Missile Guidance
It is theoretically possible to jam or spoof command guidance signals transmitted to an interceptor missile, thereby steering it off course.
By injecting noise or false signals, electronic countermeasures (ECM) can disrupt or corrupt the uplink, potentially causing the missile to miss its target. Advanced ECM systems may even inject false command packets, effectively redirecting the missile in flight.
Jamming and spoofing of missile guidance have been successfully employed in the past. These techniques can be executed from aerial or ground-based platforms. For example, during the Gulf War, the United States used EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft to degrade and disrupt Iraqi surface-to-air missile systems.
Russia’s Krasukha-4 is a ground-based broadband electronic warfare system designed to interfere with the guidance and radar systems of missiles.
Mounted on a BAZ-6910-022 four-axle chassis, the Krasukha-4 operates in the X-band and Ku-band and is capable of disrupting missile uplinks, radar seekers of precision-guided munitions (PGMs), and RF data links. Its multifunctional jamming capability poses a significant threat to systems relying on command guidance or RF-based terminal homing.
Spoofing Challenges
Jamming or spoofing uplink signals is not an easy task. Interceptor missiles typically use encrypted communication links and authentication protocols to prevent unauthorized command injection.
Many modern systems also employ frequency-hopping and spread-spectrum techniques, making it difficult for adversaries to effectively jam or spoof the signal. Additionally, advanced electronic filters and anti-jamming algorithms are built into both ground control and missile systems to detect and reject interference.
Spoofing, in particular, requires an extraordinary level of technical sophistication. It must be executed in real time while the interceptor is flying at high supersonic speeds (Mach 2–6), leaving only a narrow window of opportunity for successful intervention.
As the interceptor nears its target, it typically transitions to terminal guidance using its onboard seeker—whether infrared, semi-active radar homing (SARH), active radar homing (ARH), electro-optical, or track-via-missile (TVM).
Once the seeker locks onto the target, command guidance becomes irrelevant, and jamming or spoofing the uplink signal is no longer effective.
Furthermore, modern surface-to-air missiles, such as the Aster 30 or SM-6, are equipped with highly accurate inertial navigation systems (INS) and active radar seekers, thereby reducing their dependence on mid-course command guidance.
In many cases, these missiles can follow pre-programmed flight paths or rely entirely on onboard sensors from launch to intercept.
Conclusion
There is no definitive publicly available visual evidence that conclusively demonstrates fratricide—that is, friendly fire incidents among different layers of Israel’s air defense systems (such as Iron Dome, David’s Sling, or Arrow)—during the June 16, 2025, Iranian missile attack on Israel.
The only widely circulated evidence is a video that, at best, appears to show Arrow interceptor missiles veering off course. However, the footage is inconclusive and does not confirm direct hits on friendly air defense assets.
In the past, Iran has demonstrated notable electronic warfare (EW) and GPS spoofing capabilities, particularly in incidents involving U.S. drones. In December 2011, Iran captured a U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel stealth drone near Kashmar, allegedly through GPS spoofing.
According to Iranian claims, EW specialists jammed the drone’s satellite communications link, forcing it into autopilot mode. They then spoofed GPS coordinates, tricking the drone into landing in Iran under the assumption it was returning to its base in Afghanistan.
The near-pristine condition of the captured drone—exhibiting only minor damage to its left wing and underbelly—lent credibility to the Iranian claim of a controlled landing rather than a crash or shoot-down.
While direct evidence of fratricidal engagements among Israeli interceptor missiles is lacking, Iran likely possesses the technical capability to spoof command uplink signals. However, Iran is not known to operate aerial platforms capable of deploying such spoofing systems within the effective range of Israeli airspace.
In March 2024, reports emerged that Iran had developed a terrestrial electronic warfare system known as Cobra-V, reportedly with capabilities comparable to the Russian Krasukha-4.
The Cobra-V8 variant was showcased during an Iranian military exercise. Its design—featuring two circular dish antennas and horizontal panels—closely resembles that of the Krasukha-4, suggesting it may be either an indigenized version or a licensed copy.
Armada International speculated that Iran may have procured the Krasukha-4 from Russia or is producing it under license, rebranded as Cobra-V8.
However, when operating from within Iranian territory, the Cobra-V8 would be out of effective range to jam or spoof command guidance systems of Israeli air defense interceptors during actual engagements.
- Vijainder K Thakur is a retired IAF Jaguar pilot, author, software architect, entrepreneur, and military analyst.
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