OPED By Dr. Imran Khurshid
The recent crisis between India and Pakistan, following the deadly Pahalgam terror attack on April 22, should serve as a wake-up call about China’s “deep geostrategic alignment” with Pakistan and its unambiguous backing for it, both diplomatically and militarily, in its animosity toward India.
China has constantly supported Pakistan, strengthening its defense capabilities and protecting it diplomatically on global platforms such as the United Nations.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China has emerged as the largest arms supplier to Pakistan, accounting for 81% of its arms imports between 2020 and 2024. More than 85% of Pakistan’s defense equipment is now Chinese, including modern jet fighters, radars, naval vessels, submarines, and missile systems.
Notably, the JF-17 aircraft, jointly developed by China and Pakistan, remains a cornerstone of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF).
In the latest confrontation, Pakistan deployed Chinese J-10C fighters equipped with PL-15 missiles, marking the first time these systems were used in actual combat.
Notably, India recovered a PL-15E missile in Punjab, providing valuable intelligence for developing countermeasures against this emerging threat. Countries like Japan, given its hostile relationship with China, are reportedly keen to study this missile to assess its potential limitations.
As Siemon Wezeman of SIPRI rightly observes, ”Any state producing or buying weapons is keen to see how the product does in real conflict. Tests and exercises can tell most about the capabilities of weapons, but the ultimate test is often combat.”
Strategic Containment Through Pakistan & Beyond
China’s support for Pakistan extends far beyond arms supplies. At the United Nations Security Council, Beijing has consistently shielded Pakistan-based terrorist groups from international censure by blocking their designation as global threats.
Most recently, in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terrorist attack that claimed 26 lives, China backed Pakistan in diluting the UNSC’s condemnation. The final statement deliberately omitted any mention of the TRF responsible for the Pahalgam terror attack.
The TRF is an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba, with a name change to bypass international scrutiny. This calculated obstruction highlights China’s broader strategy of protecting Pakistan diplomatically, even at the cost of weakening global counterterrorism efforts and undermining the credibility of the UNSC sanctions regime.
During the recent crisis, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi officially supported Pakistan’s actions and position, praising Islamabad’s “restraint” and “responsible approach,” while indirectly presenting India as the aggressor, disregarding its legitimate security concerns, and overlooking cross-border terrorism being perpetrated from Pakistan.
The Chinese Foreign Office reaffirmed that China, as Pakistan’s “all-weather strategic cooperative partner,” is fully committed to assisting Pakistan in maintaining its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
This support is not new. China has always supported Pakistan from the very beginning of India’s independence, as it has always viewed it as a counterweight against India. From the 1965 and 1971 wars to the Kargil conflict and more recent tensions, Beijing has extended diplomatic, military, and technological assistance to Islamabad, including the transfer of advanced missile and nuclear technologies.
Chinese leadership always talks about big things like peaceful coexistence with India and a “shared Asian century,” but it has always tried to create problems for India in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond.
China’s support for Pakistan forms a deliberate element of Beijing’s grand geostrategy: to confine India within its western borders, restrict its maritime ambitions, and hinder its emergence as a global power.
Chinese strategic thinking is deeply rooted in a realist worldview, shaped by centuries of geopolitical thought and experience. Chinese great strategist Sun Tzu famously said, “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” Mao Zedong repeatedly invoked the ancient Chinese phrase, “Two tigers cannot live on one mountain.”
The real issue is not merely border disputes but a larger geostrategic and geopolitical rivalry. Even if border disputes are settled between the two countries, the competitive power dynamics will continue.
China views itself as the “Middle” Kingdom”—the natural centre of regional and global order. Driven by a desire to reclaim its imperial past and overcome the “Century of Humiliation” inflicted by Western powers for approximately 100 years, China carries a historical grievance that often manifests as a victim mentality, seeking to shift the burden of its past onto others.
Its ambition is to re-establish a central, dominant role in global affairs akin to an empire. Unfortunately for India, its rise is occurring in the same region where China aspires to be the unchallenged hegemon.
The evolving China-India rivalry reflects the classical dilemma of power balancing in international politics. Those who are dismissive of the importance of “spheres of influence” should reflect on the ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis, which was sparked by Russia’s belief that its traditional sphere of influence was being encroached by U.S.-led NATO countries.
Similarly, China sees India’s expanding influence in Asia as an intrusion into its “perceived zone of dominance.”
A significant challenge lies within sections of India’s strategic community that continue to underestimate the Chinese threat and downplay its growing geostrategic alliance with Pakistan.
Ignoring China’s activities as a national security threat is tantamount to burying one’s head in the sand—something India painfully experienced during the June 2020 Galwan clash, where 20 Indian soldiers lost their lives.
In the early 1960s, Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, had optimistically embraced China in good faith with a vision of shared regional prosperity, famously supporting the Panchsheel Agreement.
However, this confidence was dashed in 1962, when China invaded India. The tragic memory of that conflict was captured in Lata Mangeshkar’s patriotic song “Aye Mere Watan Ke Logon,” which moved Nehru to tears.
Many believe that heartbreak weighed heavily on him until his final days. Yet, history seems to be repeating itself, as India continues to misjudge China’s long-term strategic intentions and fails to adopt a strategic, integrated approach to counter the evolving challenges posed by the Dragon-Scorpion nexus.
China’s Multi-Faceted Warfare
China’s strategy toward India extends far beyond conventional military and diplomatic channels. It encompasses information warfare, narrative control, and influence operations.
Beijing funds academics, journalists, think tanks, and media outlets globally to propagate narratives that align with its geopolitical interests. This approach also involves digital surveillance and building extensive influence networks within media and academia.
In recent years, Chinese actors have allegedly supported anti-India propaganda in international media through covert funding or strategic partnerships. Many anti-India narratives in prominent global forums are often authored or influenced by individuals and organizations with direct or indirect ties to Chinese or Pakistani interests.
Following the Pahalgam attack, China notably refrained from labelling it as terrorism. Instead, Chinese officials emphasized that “India and Pakistan are and always will be each other’s neighbours,” underscoring their own shared neighbourhood.
This stance was widely interpreted as an attempt to downplay the attack and shield Pakistan from international criticism. Furthermore, China amplified Pakistan’s false narratives and protected its own defense exports from scrutiny, particularly after Pakistan’s military losses exposed limitations in Chinese-supplied systems like the HQ-9 missile defense.
China continues to provide Pakistan with satellite intelligence and real-time data, significantly enhancing its military capabilities. India’s Operation Sindoor, launched on the night of May 6–7, achieved its tactical objectives but simultaneously exposed vulnerabilities in Chinese-made defense systems, with the HQ-9 failing to intercept precision Indian strikes.
While India’s precision strikes marked a military success, they also highlighted the close connection between China’s military credibility and Pakistan’s defense capabilities.
Conclusion
India must adopt a balance-of-power approach to effectively counter China’s rise. It must acknowledge that the China-Pakistan nexus is not incidental but structural and deliberate.
As the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency noted in its 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment, “India views China as its primary adversary, and Pakistan as an ancillary security problem.”
This prioritization reflects strategic realism rather than sentiment. India needs to approach China’s ambitions and engagements with prudence.
In 1990, China signed border agreements with India, not with the intention of achieving lasting peace, but to buy time—time to focus on economic development and military consolidation.
This was part of its broader strategy of “biding time and hiding strength.” Today, as the world’s second-largest economy and a major global power, China is flexing its muscles toward India and actively supporting Pakistan.
This two-pronged strategy—diplomatic engagement with India alongside strategic empowerment of Pakistan—has been central to Beijing’s containment calculus.
Therefore, India must view China not through rose-colored glasses but through a prism of hard power, realpolitik, and geopolitical foresight.
Strengthening strategic posture, deepening partnerships with like-minded countries, and shedding outdated illusions are imperative steps. India must confront the reality that China’s ultimate goal is to dominate Asia, and preventing India’s rise is central to that ambition.
- Dr. Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Peace Studies (ICPS), New Delhi. He specializes in India-US relations, Indo-Pacific studies, and South Asian security issues.
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